By Philip D. Morrison, Esq.
Deloitte Tax LLP, Washington, DC
In addition to the normal procedures (though much-accelerated)of making revisions to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operationand Development (OECD) Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the OECDModel Treaty Commentaries, the OECD's Base Erosion and ProfitShifting (BEPS) Action Plan contemplates the development of -amultilateral instrument designed to provide an innovative approachto international tax matters, reflecting the rapidly evolvingnature of the global economy and the need to adapt quickly to thisevolution.
The development and adoption of such an instrument faces somesignificant hurdles, particularly in the United States.
Broad multilateral treaties in the income tax arena are notcommon. Typically, if multilateral tax treaties are moderatelybroad in scope, they will be concluded among only a regional groupof countries. The last 25 years have seen a limited number ofexamples, such as the 2008 West African Economic and Monetary Union(WAEMU) Income and Inheritance Tax Convention; the 2007Ibero-American Social Security Convention; the 2005 SAARC (SouthAsian Association for Regional Cooperation) Income Tax Agreement;the 2004 Andean Community Income and Capital Tax Convention; the1994 CARICOM (Caribbean) Income Tax Agreement; and the 1990 ArabMaghreb Union Income Tax Convention.
In the income tax realm, only where the subject matter is verynarrowly focused have treaties among multiple countries outside asingle region been adopted widely. The primary example of such atreaty entered into in the past 25 years is the 1988 OECD/Councilof Europe Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in TaxMatters.1
Notwithstanding the scanty precedent for a multi-issue,multilateral income tax treaty, the Action Plan suggests that sucha treaty might include - the introduction of an anti-treaty abuseprovision, changes to the definition of permanent establishment,changes to transfer pricing provisions and the introduction oftreaty provisions in relation to hybrid mismatch arrangements.
Obtaining agreement on these subjects simply among the delegatesto the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs and drafting a proposedtreaty, all by December 2015, is very ambitious. Actually gettingmore than a few member governments to sign on to such a treaty mayprove even more difficult.
One of the impediments to accomplishing much through such atreaty, at least for the United States, is the rule reflected inArticle 1(2) of the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty:2. This Convention shallnot restrict in any manner any benefit now or hereafteraccorded:
a) by the laws of either Contracting State….
According to Peter Blessing's treatise on treaties, thisreflects a "fundamental principle of U.S. income tax treaties …that the treaty can only add to, not detract from, the rights thata taxpayer otherwise enjoys." One might call this a "first, do noharm" rule - sort of a start to a Hippocratic Oath for treatynegotiators. Virtually every tax treaty entered into by the UnitedStates contains this or a very similar provision.2
While neither the OECD Model Treaty nor the Commentaries thereoncontain similar language, the Technical Explanation (TE) to theU.S. Model Treaty (as well as TEs to bilateral U.S. treatiescontaining it) claims that this provision "states the generallyaccepted relationship between the Convention and domestic law."Although, outside U.S. tax treaties and commentary thereon, thiscommentator is unaware of clear and specific evidence ofinternational acceptance of this "generally accepted relationship,"it is noteworthy that the OECD Model Treaty has various provisionsthat say a Contracting State "may" tax something or "shall not" taxsomething but apparently does not have provisions that provide thata Contracting State "shall" tax something. So perhaps othercountries agree with the United States that this is a fundamentalprinciple but are just less specific in its statement.
In any event, it is clear that the United States could notaccept any provision of the proposed BEPS multilateral treaty thatrestricted benefits granted under the Code and regulations. So if the BEPS treaty attempted to do that, the United States couldnever be a signatory. If other countries are similarly constrained,either as a legal or constitutional matter or as a practicalpolitical matter, that certainly would narrow the scope of any suchtreaty.
This could be a particular constraint with respect to dealingwith what is perhaps the thorniest, yet most critical, of the BEPSissues: hybrid instruments, entities, and arrangements. Thedrafters of the Action Plan seem to have taken the limitations of amultilateral treaty somewhat into account in their description ofpossible solutions. As one treaty-based approach, they suggest thattreaty benefits might be denied for hybrids.
The United States has already incorporated such a concept intomany of its treaties through the addition of special rules fordetermining the residence of a hybrid entity. Presumably somethingof this sort might be included in a multilateral treaty. However, while the United States has been fairly consistent in itsmore modern treaties by using the U.S. Model Treaty provision or aclose variation in most cases, there are important outliers, suchas the fifth protocol amendments to the Residence article of theU.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty.
Other possible solutions to hybrids mentioned in the Action Planare unsuitable for a multilateral treaty. Using treaties to denydeductions for income items not included in income by the payee'scountry, to deny double deductions, or to deny exemption ornon-recognition for payments deductible by the payor, for example,would run afoul of the "first, do no harm" principle describedabove. The Action Plan appears to recognize this by describingthese as requiring domestic law changes. The Action Plan quiterightly also notes the likely need for co-ordination or tie-breakerrules where two or more countries try to simultaneously apply suchrules. Without such rules, of course, where two countriesboth simultaneously seek to prevent double non-taxation, the resultis likely to be double taxation. While, at first blush, doubletaxation may appear to be a topic for treaties, it is difficult tosee how this could be accomplished without running afoul of the"first, do no harm" rule. Coordinating the denial of reducedwithholding rates (treaty benefits) would be fine; coordinating thedenial of deductions or exemptions would not.
Another issue noted by the Action Plan as ripe for beingaddressed by a multilateral treaty is the introduction of ananti-treaty-abuse provision. Again, however, the inclusion of sucha provision is unlikely to be acceptable to the UnitedStates. As readers know, virtually every U.S. tax treaty withgenerous reductions in withholding tax has a comprehensiveLimitation on Benefits (LOB) article. LOB articles in recenttreaties with an exemption for certain dividends or with low-taxcountries tend to be quite strict. Other LOB articles, althoughcomprehensive, are slightly less constraining. Bothvarieties, however, tend to be complex, are sometimes difficult toapply (particularly since there is little to no published guidancefrom the IRS), and have, over the years, garnered a fair amount ofcriticism from foreign treaty academics.
It is unlikely that an OECD-approved multilateral treaty wouldembrace the U.S. LOB article or even a U.S.-style LOB article.Instead, one might expect something on the order of the "mainpurpose test" that limits reduced withholding tax rates and isincluded in some other countries' bilateral treaties.3 But this approachwas rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999 during its consideration ofthe then-pending U.S.-Italy and U.S.-Slovenia income taxtreaties. The Senate was concerned that such an approach wasoverly subjective and unduly vague, represented a fundamental shiftin tax treaty policy about which it had not been consulted, wasunadministrable, and did not adequately distinguish betweenlegitimate business transactions and tax avoidance transactions.Following the Senate's formal reservations with respect to theseprovisions, the U.S. Treasury never again accepted a main purposeanti-abuse rule except in very limited circumstances.4 Given theSenate's concerns, it is unlikely that the United States would bewilling to accept a variation of a main purpose test in lieu of itsLOB provisions.
Other issues that the Action Plan suggests might be addressed bya multilateral treaty include changes to the treaty definition of"permanent establishment" (PE) and changes to transfer pricingprovisions. While the former issue is one that seems well-suited toa multilateral treaty, it is far from clear that it is in theUnited States' best interest to embrace the changes that are likelyto be proposed. As discussed in an earlier Commentary,5 Action 7 appearsaimed at expanding the PE concept to allow commissionaires toconstitute PEs and to allow commissionaires and other limited riskcommission agents to create a PE for their principals to which canbe attributed all the profits of a full-risk distributor. TheUnited States needs to be very cautious in this area. Ownership ofinventory and accounts receivable matter; each involves rewardablerisk that commission agents are unlikely to incur. It is also clearthat if the multilateral treaty's provisions expanded the PEconcept to be broader than a "U.S. trade or business" as defined bycase law, or expanded attributable income to be broader thaneffectively connected income, the United States would either needto reject the treaty or note that, to the extent it attempts to sobroaden U.S. domestic law, the treaty would have no effect.
Changes that the Action Plan outlines with respect to transferpricing could also include a combination of domestic lawrecommendations together with possible provisions in a multilateraltreaty. This could be a fruitful area of exploration regarding theappropriate language for a multilateral treaty. Any such broadeningof Article 9's application is unlikely to conflict with thealready-much-broader §482. As I will discuss in a laterCommentary, it might also, generally to taxpayers' detriment, endthe charade that current rules are always compliant with thearm's-length principle.
This commentary also will appear in the October 2013 issueof the Tax Management International Journal. For more information, in the Tax Management Portfolios,see Daher and Aceves, 536 T.M., Interest Expense Deductions,Maruca and Warner, 886 T.M., Transfer Pricing: The Code,the Regulations, and Selected Case Law, and Nauheim and Scott,938 T.M., U.S. Income Tax Treaties - Income Not Attributableto a Permanent Establishment, and in Tax Practice Series,see ¶2330, Interest Expense, ¶3600, Section 482 - Allocations ofIncome and Deductions Between Related Taxpayers, and ¶7160, U.S.Income Tax Treaties.
1 The 1990 EU Arbitration Convention is an exampleof a multilateral treaty that is both narrowly focused andregional.
2 This provision may reflect the U.S.Constitution's requirement that revenue legislation must originatein the House of Representatives together with the Constitution'sprovision that treaties need only be consented to by theSenate.
3 E.g., Convention Between The UnitedKingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland And The Republic OfHungary For The Avoidance Of Double Taxation And The Prevention OfFiscal Evasion With Respect To Taxes On Income And On CapitalGains, September 7, 2011.
4 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. treaty provisiondealing with an anti-conduit rule.
5 "BEPS (Part 1) - An `Action Plan' with SomeInternal Contradictions," 42 Tax Mgmt. Int'l J. 557(9/13/13).