After Textron: “What Is to Be Done?”
By Kenneth J. Krupsky,
Esq.
Jones Day,Washington, DC
In U.S. v. Textron
Inc.1 the First
Circuit, en banc, considered whether the attorney work product
doctrine shielded from an IRS summons “tax accrual work
papers” prepared by lawyers and others in Textron's tax
department to support Textron's calculation of tax reserves in its
audited financial statements. The narrow legal issue was the
application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(A), which
provides in relevant part, “Ordinarily, a party may not discover
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party …. .”
(Emphasis added.)
At trial, the district court held that the attorney-client
privilege was waived when Textron provided the work papers to its
outside accountant, Ernst & Young. However, the court still denied
the Service access to the papers because it found that, although the
papers were used for a business purpose, they “would not have
been prepared at all 'but for’ the fact that Textron anticipated
the possibility of litigation with the
IRS.”2
On the initial appeal, the First Circuit's three-judge panel
affirmed the lower court, rejecting the Service's contention that the
“mere presence of a business or regulatory purpose defeats
work-product protection.”3
However, in March 2009 the First Circuit vacated the panel's decision,
and on August 13, in a 3-2 decision, the full court reversed the
district ruling, holding that Textron's tax accrual work papers were
not protected by the work product doctrine.
In sum, the “final” Textron decision limits the
scope of protected attorney work product to materials “prepared
for use in” or “done for” possible litigation. The
court wrote:
To
sum up, the work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done
for litigation, not in preparing financial statements. Textron's work
papers were prepared to support financial filings and gain auditor
approval; the compulsion of the securities laws and auditing
requirements assure that they will be carefully prepared, in their
present form, even though not protected; and IRS access serves the
legitimate, and important, function of detecting and disallowing
abusive tax shelters.
The decision thus adopts yet one more formulation of the work
product doctrine, and it is strikingly different from the rules
applicable in several other circuits. The Fifth Circuit follows a test
that focuses on whether “the primary purpose” of documents
was to prepare for potential litigation, while the Second, Sixth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits adopt a “because of” or
“but for” potential litigation
test.4
In a vigorous dissent, two judges characterized the impact of the
decision this way: “In straining to craft a rule favorable to
the IRS as a matter of tax law, the majority has thrown the law of
work-product protection into disarray. … The time is ripe for
the Supreme Court to intervene and set the circuits straight on this
issue which is essential to the daily practice of litigators across
the country.”5
This commentary will not consider whether the new Textron
rule is “right” as a matter of law or
“policy,” whether it is consistent with prior precedents,
or whether the decision should or will be adopted in other circuits,
or reviewed, reversed, or sustained by the Supreme Court. I will
instead offer a few ideas for tax directors and their counsel to
consider in evaluating how they will do business after Textron,
which is today the law in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto
Rico and Rhode Island.6
Some further background. Textron's tax work papers listed items in
its return that, if identified and challenged by the Service, could
result in additional tax claims. The tax accrual spreadsheets listed
each debatable item, including the dollar amount of the possible
dispute and a percentage estimate of the Service's chances of success.
The spreadsheets reflecting these calculations were in some instances
supported by “backup emails or notes.” Textron's tax
lawyers were “centrally involved” in preparing these
materials, and Textron “also used an outside counsel to advise
it on tax reserve requirements.” As described by the district
court, the backup materials included “notes and memoranda
written by Textron's in-house tax attorneys reflecting their opinions
as to which items should be included on the spreadsheet and the hazard
of litigation percentage that should apply to each
item.”7 Unfortunately, there
is no further specific description in the opinions as to the content
of the backup emails, notes, and memoranda.
The majority emphasized that the trial judge did not find that the
papers were “prepared for use in possible litigation,” but
only that the reserves would cover liabilities that might be
determined in litigation. The majority concluded that even if the
judge had made a “for use” finding, “that finding
would have been clearly erroneous.”
What did Textron's executives and tax lawyers do wrong, and what
might other professionals do to increase the chances - by no means
certain - of work product protection for a tax lawyer's backup emails,
notes, and memoranda (assuming, without conceding, that there is no
reasonable hope in the First Circuit for tax accrual spreadsheets and
percentage estimates)? The majority opinion provides a number of
potential guideposts, albeit vague and uncertain, as
follows:
Any
experienced litigator would describe the [Textron] tax accrual work
papers as tax documents and not as case preparation materials. …
Every lawyer who tries cases knows the touch and feel of materials
prepared for a current or possible (i.e., “in anticipation
of”) law suit. … No one with experience of law suits would
talk about tax accrual work papers in those terms. A set of tax
reserve figures, calculated for purposes of accurately stating a
company's financial figures, has in ordinary parlance only that
purpose: to support a financial statement and the independent audit of
it. … [M]any of the debatable cases affording work product
protection involve documents unquestionably prepared for potential use
in litigation if and when it should arise. There is no evidence in
this case that the work papers were prepared for such a use or would
in fact serve any useful purpose for Textron in conducting litigation
if it arose.
So, here are a few ideas to consider when a client seeks tax advice
(whether or not in connection with preparing tax accrual work papers):
•
Clearly indicate in writing (if true) that the material is intended to
constitute “attorney work product” and that it has been
requested by the client and prepared by the attorneys “for use
in” and has been “done for” possible litigation.
Identify the possible nature of and parties to the litigation, and the
“useful purpose” that the work is intended to serve in
conducting litigation if it should arise.
•
Keep all such material in a separate file, preferably in the office of
a lawyer (either an in-house or outside lawyer).
•
The lawyers preparing the material preferably should be tax attorneys
who themselves have litigation experience (trial and appeals) or, if
they do not, litigation attorneys should be involved along with the
“substantive” tax lawyers.
•
If in-house lawyers are involved, preferably they should be persons
who function in the company only as lawyers, i.e., they do not wear
two hats and function both as lawyers and as tax directors or in other
non-legal roles. Outside lawyers presumably function only as
lawyers.
•
The materials preferably should have the “touch and feel”
of materials that “every lawyer who tries cases knows …
[were] prepared for a current or possible (i.e., 'in anticipation
of’) law suit.” What does this mean? Presumably, items
such as: (1) notes of interviews of potential witnesses; (2) marked-up
copies of critical company documents (e.g., board resolutions,
contracts, invoices, books of account, emails), reflecting the
attorney's evaluations as relevant to trial and appeal of litigation;
(3) possible trial scenarios and strategies, such as the order of
presentation of witnesses and documents, questions for cross-examining
opposing witnesses and experts, draft trial summation statements,
etc.; (4) possible appeal scenarios and strategies, such as grounds
for appeal, identifying reversal error by the trier of fact, etc.; (5)
evaluation of differences in litigating the case in the Tax Court, the
Claims Court or a district court, including differences in law or
practice in different circuits; and (6) evaluation of possible
settlement strategies, not only with the Service's Appeals Office, but
more particularly the Service's relevant District Counsel who could be
involved in litigation.
All of these seem fairly obvious. How many tax executives and tax
counsel have considered these points and gone to these potentially
costly efforts in obtaining and providing tax advice in the past?
Usually (not always) tax controversies present primarily questions of
law, not fact, so that witness interviews, affidavits, and similar
materials that have the touch and feel of trial preparation have, in
the past, been thought to be less important, if not irrelevant. Is the
cost of such efforts worth the potential benefit with regard to the
particular issue in the particular context?
The Textron majority appears to have been so hostile to the
case before it that one wonders whether any “work
product” claim, at least in the context of preparing public
company financial statements, would pass muster with it. Nevertheless,
one must take the Court of Appeals at its word, and hope that if the
lawyer's product genuinely has the right touch and feel, it will be
respected as protected work product. Prudence suggests that these
questions should be addressed and current business practices
re-evaluated promptly.
This commentary also will appear in the November 2009 issue of
the Tax Management International Journal. For more information,
in the Tax Management Portfolios, see Schmehl and Fox, 633 T.M.,
Compelled Production of Documents and Testimony in Tax Examinations,
and in Tax Practice Series, see ¶3850, Examination: Audits,
Assessments, Appeals.
1
No. 07-2631 (1st Cir. 8/13/09).
2
U.S. v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 at 143 (D.R.I. 2007).
3
U.S. v. Textron Inc., 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2009).
4
See U.S. v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984); U.S. v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2004); and Senate of Puerto Rico v. United States Dep't of Justice, 823 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
5
As of this writing, it is anticipated that Textron will file a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
6
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and not of Jones Day, any of our clients, or any other person.
7
Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
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