Overriding Income Tax Treaties in Codifying a New LOB
By Philip D. Morrison,
Esq.
Deloitte Tax LLP, Washington, DC
At the time this is being written, the Ways and Means Committee has
reported a bill, H.R. 3200, “America's Affordable Health Choices
Act of 2009” (“AAHCA”), which contains a provision
(§451 of the bill) that would override all U.S. income tax
treaties. While the provision may be discarded as part of health care
reform in favor of other revenue raisers, it is worth examining the
provision and its various impacts, because the provision may
re-surface again in the future. The provision is, after all, estimated
to raise $7.5 billion in revenue over 10 years -- a modest amount in
the current era of trillion-dollar deficits but not yet a rounding
error. Many are also asking whether this provision will survive
through final enactment, so some speculation on that point is also
warranted.
The bill would amend §894 to provide that treaty benefits for
“deductible related-party payments” would be available
only where the “foreign parent corporation” (of the group
that includes the otherwise Limitation-on-Benefits (LOB)-qualified,
treaty-resident recipient of such payment) could itself obtain treaty
benefits were the deductible payment made directly to such parent. So,
for example, an interest payment to a U.K. affiliate with a
substantial active business in the United Kingdom would not be
eligible for the elimination of U.S. interest withholding tax
otherwise provided by the U.S.-U.K. treaty if the U.K. affiliate were
owned by a Hong Kong company.
Unlike many cases of claimed treaty override by statute, this
provision would clearly override all U.S. income tax treaties,
including those with comprehensive LOB articles (“LOBs”).
Thus, a company's substantial active business operations in a treaty
country would no longer suffice if the company were owned by a parent
company not entitled to the benefits of a treaty. This is somewhat
surprising, given the lack of any indication in the past 15-plus years
of treaty ratification hearings that the LOBs contained in recent
treaties were deficient.
As readers know, tax treaty overrides are not unconstitutional, nor
even uncontemplated by the authors of the Internal Revenue Code. While
most of the rest of the world gives tax treaties a higher status than
purely domestic law, §7852(d) explicitly provides that neither a
treaty nor a revenue law has preferential status in the United
States.1 Therefore, as the
legislative history confirms, the “later-in-time” rule
generally applies -- whichever is enacted later
controls.2 It is clear that
Congress can override tax treaties -- it clearly has that
power. Whether it should is another question. Typically, treaty
overrides are avoided unless there is no other way for Congress to
implement a critical tax policy objective. Clearly, in the case of a
broad treaty override, such should be overwhelmingly
justified.
One justification given for the provision in AAHCA is that it may
compel a jurisdiction with which we have no tax treaty to enter into
treaty negotiations. That policy objective is unlikely to be achieved,
however, as it is far from certain that Treasury would want to
inaugurate (or Congress encourage) negotiations looking to a
comprehensive income tax treaty reducing or eliminating U.S.
withholding tax with jurisdictions not likely to impose any meaningful
tax on payments made from the United States to affiliates in such
jurisdictions and/or that have little inward investment from the
United States that Treasury would bargain to protect from local
tax.
A second justification given for the provision is that it would
hamper so-called “inverted” or expatriated companies from
obtaining treaty benefits. (At least one bill to deal with this issue
has specifically targeted expatriated
companies.)3 Generally speaking,
an inverted or expatriated company is a U.S. company that has become
foreign. Since 2003, successfully expatriating is quite difficult, if
not impossible, due to the enactment of §7874. In addition, both
before and since 2003, expatriating incurs either a shareholder-level
or corporate-level exit tax. Still, some in Congress have previously
expressed concern with a successfully expatriated company obtaining
treaty benefits through finance or intellectual property-licensing
affiliates in certain
jurisdictions.4 In certain
jurisdictions, an affiliate might attempt to qualify for treaty
benefits by attempting to prove that greater than 50% of the top
public company's stock is owned by individual U.S. shareholders (and
that there is no base erosion). Again, however, the H.R. 3200
provision is too broad. Newer treaties and protocols (e.g., the
treaty with the Netherlands) prevent this with a strict
“substantial presence” requirement, so there is no reason
to override those treaties.
Thus, a major problem with the provision is that countries that
have agreed to strong, modern LOBs would be just as adversely affected
as countries that have not. The proposal would impact every current
treaty that the United States has, even those with the most up-to-date
LOBs (and even those with countries that are highly unlikely to be a
host for treaty shoppers (because of their domestic tax rules)). If
enacted, the United States would hear loud and clear from most of its
treaty partners in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development about its inappropriate and unnecessary treaty override.
If non-LOB treaties are the target, the provision should apply only to
them.
A particularly odd impact of the provision is that, for a company
that has a foreign parent company resident in a non-treaty
jurisdiction, the active business alternative for treaty qualification
would be rendered useless. As readers know, all modern LOBs permit
treaty benefits for income derived in connection with (or incidental
to) an active trade or business that is conducted in the treaty
resident's country. That trade or business must be a business other
than managing investments for the resident's own account, unless the
resident is a bank, insurance company, or securities dealer. The
active business in the resident's country must also be substantial in
relation to the business in the United States which is making the
treaty-benefitted payments.5 The
“in connection with” requirement is typically satisfied if
the payor business is in the same line, or a complementary line, of
business as the payee. Affiliates under common control are aggregated
to determine the qualification as, and the substantiality of, an
active trade or business.
Of all the several ways to qualify under an LOB, the active
business test seems the one with the greatest policy justification.
The active business test actually requires bricks and mortar in the
treaty resident's country. When the substantiality test is layered on,
it is virtually impossible to plan into treaty qualification without
meaningful assets, personnel, and income in the treaty resident's
country. Other LOB tests, while all justifiable in this writer's view,
have somewhat weaker policy
justifications.6
Altogether, given its uneven impact and less-than-well-targeted
policy implications, this treaty override doesn't seem to meet the
“overwhelmingly justified” test. The provision is too
broad, and it would eliminate the most sensible of the several means
to qualify under an LOB. All of this seems to indicate, to this writer
at least, that the provision is unlikely to survive as part of the
AAHCA -- that the Administration will oppose it, the Senate will
reject it as part of their bill, and the Senate will prevail in the
House-Senate Conference Committee on the bill.
Although the provision raises only a modest amount of revenue in
the context of a health reform effort that may require $600 billion or
more of tax increases, it will provide the Ways and Means members who
will eventually sit on the Conference Committee with a bargaining chip
that outweighs its relative size as a revenue raiser. It is axiomatic
that if treaties can be overridden unilaterally by the United States,
and actually are with any regularity, other countries will be less
willing to enter into them, or to make meaningful concessions under
them. The Senate, in its role in giving advice and consent regarding
treaties, and the Administration, in its role in negotiating and
concluding treaties, have significant roles in the tax treaty process
and each has historically thought that its role, and the products
produced thereby, were important. The Administration and the Senate
have, therefore, a greater interest in seeing that the tax treaty
process is not disrupted by legislative overrides, at least not unless
that override is overwhelmingly justified. The House, and the Ways and
Means members, on the other hand, have far less interest, having no
role in the tax treaty process at
all.7 This is not simply a result
of jealousy over “turf.” Indeed, as tax treaties generally
trade reductions in U.S. tax for reciprocal reductions in foreign tax,
over the years some Ways and Means Committee members have looked at
tax treaties with a critical eye. It has been suggested that, because
tax treaties generally cut U.S. tax, they might be viewed not solely
as treaties but also as a type of revenue measure. Because the
Constitution requires that revenue bills start in the people's
House,8 the complete absence of
House involvement in tax treaties might be seen as conflicting with
the spirit of that requirement. This argument gives the Ways and Means
members a “principled” foundation, in addition to the tax
policy reasons outlined above, to support this provision, even if the
principled foundation goes unstated.
The intensity with which the Senate and the Executive Branch
typically resist treaty overrides may give Ways and Means Conference
Committee members a bargaining chip with which to obtain important
concessions from either the Administration or the Senate. In this
writer's view, these political dynamics make it all the more likely
that the provision will be traded away and not survive in the final
version of AAHCA.
This commentary also will appear in the October 2009 issue of
the Tax Management International Journal. For more information,
in the Tax Management Portfolios, see Tello, 915 T.M., U.S.
Withholding and Reporting Requirements for Payments of U.S. Source
Income to Foreign Persons, and Levine and Miller, 936 T.M.,
U.S. Income Tax Treaties -- The Limitation on Benefits Article, and
in Tax Practice Series, see ¶7140, U.S. Income Tax Treaties, and
¶7150, Withholding and Compliance.
1
The Constitution implies the same in Article VI: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”
2
See H.R. Rep. No. 100-795 (1988); S. Rep. No. 100-445 (1988); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-1104 (1988).
3
SeeH.R. 3970.
4
See, e.g., H.R. 3970, H.R. 3160, and H.R. 2419.
5
More recent treaties and the U.S. Model restrict the substantiality requirement to payments from related persons. Some treaties provide a substantiality safe harbor measured by assets, payroll, and gross income.
6
The public trading test appears to claim that a treaty resident is truly resident and not treaty shopping simply because it is traded on a stock exchange in the country of residence (or, in most treaties, other “qualified” exchanges). Even if it once was, in the 21st century there may be some question as to whether trading in a given country is a reliable proxy for ownership by that country's nationals (assuming such ownership matters).
7
Contrast this with trade agreements, which also tend generally to cut revenue, where the House has an equal seat at the table.
8
U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
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