Who Ate the Homework? The Treasury Department Reports to Congress
on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing, and U.S. Income Tax
Treaties
By Willard B. Taylor,
Esq.
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New York, N.Y.
On November 28, 2007, as mandated by the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004 (the “2004 Act”), the Treasury Department
submitted a report to Congress on earnings stripping, transfer
pricing, and U.S. income tax treaties, emphasizing intangible property
in the case of transfer
pricing.1 While the 2004 Act
added Code provisions intended to deter the “inversion” or
expatriation of U.S. corporations, it did not change the earnings
stripping, transfer pricing, or tax treaty abuse rules that are
arguably relevant to the “dynamics” of inversion
transactions. The Treasury was instead directed to issue a report on
the effectiveness of each of the rules. These were due in 2005. A
study of the effect of the 2004 Act's inversion provisions was also
mandated for 2005, but the report says that more time is needed to
assess their impact and also that the study should wait on the
issuance of further regulations under §7874.
In summary, the report concludes that: (1) while there is no
“conclusive evidence” of earnings stripping--defined
generally as the payment of “excessive deductible
interest” to foreign-related parties--by foreign-controlled
domestic corporations in general, there is “strong
evidence” of earnings stripping by so-called
“inverted” corporations (i.e., U.S. corporations that
inverted into, or became, foreign corporations prior to the effective
date of the 2004 Act); (2) the way forward on transfer pricing is for
the Treasury to finalize regulations relating to cost sharing,
related-party services, and global securities dealing; and (3) the
limitation on benefits articles in U.S. income tax treaties are
central to preventing the abuse of those treaties. In the absence of
sufficient information about earnings stripping, a new tax form
intended to collect information on potential earnings stripping was
released for comment at the same time the Report was
issued.2 While deferring a
report on the inversion provisions of the 2004 Act, the report does
conclude that the enactment of those provisions “appears to have
been successful in curtailing inversion transactions by large,
publicly traded corporations.”
What are we to make of this? The earnings stripping rules, in
§163(j), were enacted in 1989 and expanded in 1993 to cover
guaranteed debt, and there have since been then a number of proposals,
including proposals by the Treasury, to change
§163(j).3 Given these
proposals and the time that has elapsed since §163(j) was
enacted, it is surprising the report concludes that: (1) more
information is needed to determine whether there is earnings stripping
and how foreign-controlled domestic corporations would be affected by
the proposals for change; (2) the “overall effect of income
stripping on U.S. employment is unclear”; and (3)
“existing studies do not address the question of how income
shifting affects cross-border investment.”
In the case of inverted corporations, the report says the data
“strongly suggest that these corporations are shifting
substantially all of their income out of the United States, primarily
through interest payments.” But the source for this seems to be
limited to one private-sector
study,4 and, as noted above,
the Treasury at this time is not ready to report comprehensively on
the expatriation rules of the 2004 Act, notwithstanding the
Congressional direction to do so by the end of 2005.
Turning to income tax treaties, the report focuses on treaty-based
“abuses” of the U.S. withholding tax rules, particularly
in the case of interest and dividends, and also on the U.S. treaty
policy with respect to the elimination by treaty of the excise tax on
premiums paid to foreign insurance companies to insure or reinsure
U.S. risks.
After reviewing the history and evolution of “limitation on
benefits” articles in U.S. tax treaties through the
“model” income tax convention released by the Treasury at
the end of 2006, the report says that these articles are
“critical” and that they provide “significant
deterrence against “treaty “abuse.” It goes on to
say that there is empirical evidence that, in the absence of a
“limitation on benefits” article, withholding tax
reductions or eliminations in older treaties, such as those with
Iceland, Hungary,5 and Poland
(and Barbados prior to the 2004 protocol), have been abused, and
limitation on benefits articles in treaties appear to provide a
“significant deterrence” against abuse.
This is interesting, but is it news? The use of Hungarian and
Icelandic companies to avoid U.S. withholding taxes on interest has
been around for some time, and is essentially part of the 1995
decision that the anti-conduit regulations would not deal with
common-equity-financed foreign conduits but rather would wait on the
extension to all treaty partners of limitation on benefits
articles.
Some U.S. treaties eliminate the excise tax imposed on premiums
paid to foreign insurers, but others do
not,6 and the report says
that, when asked to do so in treaty negotiations, Treasury conducts a
“thorough review” of the taxation of the other country's
insurance industry and accedes to the request only if satisfied that
an insurance company resident in the other state will “face a
level of taxation that is substantial relative to the level” of
tax faced by U.S. insurers. This is more informative than the
Technical Explanation of the 2006 Model Treaty, which was silent on
U.S. treaty policy with respect to the excise tax. The report,
however, makes no mention of the other current issues involved in
offshore insurance and whether there is a transfer pricing problem
that needs to be
addressed.7
The part of the report dealing with transfer pricing is more
satisfying, although it includes no real surprises. The report says
that the fundamental components of the IRS’s five-part strategy
to improve the administration of §482 that were described in the
report issued in 19998 remain
unchanged. In addition, Treasury needs to finalize and modernize
transfer pricing guidance on: (1) cost sharing rules with respect to
the type and valuation of external contributions (i.e., buy-in
payments);9 (2) related party
(or “controlled”) services transactions, including
coordination with the rules that apply to transfers of intangible
property generally;10 and (3)
the determination of income from global securities dealing (i.e., the
income of a dealer in securities that operates in more than one
country).11 The cost sharing
rules were proposed in 2005, and the report states that the Treasury
Department is working to finalize these. Temporary and proposed
regulations have been issued with respect to related party services
and new proposed regulations with respect to global dealing operations
are “to be issued shortly.”
This commentary also will appear in the February 8, 2008, issue
of the Tax Management International Journal. For more
information, in the Tax Management Portfolios, see Isenbergh, 900
T.M., Foundations of U.S. International Taxation, and Levine
and Miller, 936 T.M., U.S. Income Tax Treaties -- The Limitation
on Benefits Article, and in Tax Practice Series, see ¶7110,
Foreign Income Taxation -- General Principles, and ¶7140, U.S.
Income Tax Treaties.
1
Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties, November 28, 2007, http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ajca2007.pdf.
2
Form 8926, Disqualified Corporate Interest Expense Disallowed Under Section 163(j) and Related Information, which asks for information on debt-to-equity ratios, net interest expense, adjusted taxable income, excess interest expense, disqualified interest, and the amount of the disallowance under §163(j). See also Announcement 2007-114, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1176.
3
These include proposals to eliminate the 1.5-to-1 debt-to-equity safe harbor, to drop the 50% of taxable income threshold to 35% or to 25%, to limit the carryforward of suspended deductions to five or to three years, and to exclude interest on debt guaranteed by a related person (as opposed to interest on debt to a related person) if it is established that substantially the same amount could have been borrowed without the guarantee. While some of these would apply only where the foreign parent owned an inverted U.S. corporation, others would apply without that restriction.
4
Seida & Wempe, “Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate Inversion”, Nat'l Tax J. 57(4) (December): 805-28 (calculating that the revenue cost for 2002 and 2003 from earnings stripping by the inverted corporations included in the study was more than $700 million).
5
According to the report, interest paid to related Icelandic corporations grew from $.3 million in 1998 to $912.7 million in 2004 and interest paid to related Hungarian corporations grew from $50 million in 1998 to $1,238.1 million in 2004, making those countries the 8th and 9th largest recipients of related party U.S.-source interest.
6
The excise tax is imposed on premiums for the insurance or reinsurance of U.S. risks that are paid to foreign insurance companies that do not carry on business in the United States.
7
The report does not address offshore reinsurance, which has recently been the subject of hearings before the Senate Finance Committee. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Present Law and Analysis Relating to Select International Tax Issues (JCX 85-07), September 24, 2007.
8
Report on the Application and Administration of Section 482 (April 21, 1999), which was followed two years later by Fiscal Years 2000-2001 IRS Study: Effectiveness of Internal Revenue Code Section 6662(e) (December 28, 2001).
9
See Prop. Regs. §1.482-7 (setting forth methods to determine taxable income in connection with a cost sharing arrangement).
10
See Regs. §1.482-9T (setting forth methods to determine taxable income in connection with a controlled services transaction).
11
See Prop. Regs. §1.482-8 (setting forth methods to determine taxable income in connection with global dealing operations).
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